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NEW DEAL LESSONS FOR THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT: THE 
GENERAL WELFARE CLAUSE 
Elizabeth Weeks Leonard* 
The questions put to our panel were: Is a constitutional crisis on 
the order of 1937 looming?  Are there structural similarities between 
the present period and the New Deal period?  My short answer to the 
first question is: No, there is not a constitutional crisis.  My longer an-
swer to both questions is that any crisis, or constitutionally significant 
structural similarity, derives from the spending power, not the com-
merce power, where most of the attention has been.  More im-
portantly, the controversy surrounding the Affordable Care Act, if a 
crisis at all, is political.  With crisis comes opportunity.  In this case, 
the controversy is an opportunity for us to carefully consider whether 
the predominantly private market approach to health care is the di-
rection we want to continue.  Alternatively, the debate may lead us to 
recognize that expansion of the federal welfare state toward a univer-
sal “Medicare for All” approach is not only plausible but preferable. 
First, why I say that no constitutional crisis is looming: The eco-
nomic conditions and abject nationwide suffering beginning with the 
crash of 1929 compelled the law to find a way to address societal 
needs.  Individual liberties came to encompass freedom from want 
and demand for affirmative government intervention.1  In 2012, there 
is no similarly compelling, nationwide crisis, demanding government 
response.  Ever-increasing health care costs, consuming an ever-
increasing share of gross domestic product, and rising numbers of 
uninsured, while serious national concerns, are not comparable to 
the Great Depression.  Most Americans agree that something needs 
to be done to fix the U.S. health care system.  But there is no similar 
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urgency for the Supreme Court to radically redefine the scope of 
federal power. 
In conceiving a present-day constitutional crisis, one might view 
the New Deal as representing unprecedented expansion of federal 
power, and the Affordable Care Act litigation as inviting the Court to 
contract federal power.  I maintain that the Affordable Care Act 
(“ACA”) minimum essential coverage provision,2 or “individual man-
date,” is constitutional under existing precedent.3  The issue, then, is 
whether the Court takes this opportunity to refine, or define new, 
limits on the commerce power.  I also believe that the twenty-six 
states’ challenge to ACA’s Medicaid expansion4 as a violation of the 
Tenth Amendment is unsupported by precedent.  But again, the is-
sue is whether the Court will decide to elucidate existing limits on 
conditional spending power.5  Even framing the issues in those terms, 
the controversy is not driven by overwhelming public demand to de-
crease federal power in response to societal needs or wants, similar to 
the demand to expand federal power during the New Deal. 
Taking the “even if” arguments one step further: Even if there is a 
legitimate question whether the individual mandate, in particular, 
exceeds the commerce power, the objection is to the form, not the 
substance, of expanded federal power.  Congress could get to the 
same result in other ways, which similarly depend on broad federal 
power.6  For example, Congress could condition the requirement to 
obtain health insurance on some other privilege (federal student 
loans) or activity (accessing medical care), or could truly style the law 
as a federal tax, perhaps with a credit for obtaining insurance and re-
distribution under the spending power, essentially “Medicare for All.”  
Either alternative would be an exercise of constitutional congression-
 
 2 26 U.S.C. § 5000A(a) (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring that every U.S. citizen, other than those 
falling within specified exceptions, maintain a minimum level of health insurance cover-
age for each month beginning in 2014).  See also id. § 5000A(b) (imposing a federal tax 
penalty for noncompliance). 
 3 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 4 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(10)(A)(i)(VIII) (Supp. IV 2010) (extending Medicaid eligibility to 
adults under age 65 (who are not pregnant and not already covered) with incomes up to 
133% of the federal poverty level). 
 5 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987) (“Our decisions have recognized that 
in some circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coer-
cive as to pass the point at which ‘pressure turns to compulsion.’” (quoting Steward Ma-
chine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937))). 
 6 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-392R, PRIVATE HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE: EXPERT VIEWS ON APPROACHES TO ENCOURAGE VOLUNTARY ENROLLMENT 
(2011) [hereinafter GAO Report], available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/
97317.pdf; Einer Elhauge, The Irrelevance of the Broccoli Argument against the Insurance Man-
date, NEW ENG. J. MED., Dec. 21, 2011, available at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056
/NEJMp1113618. 
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al power.  Federal power would still be expanded at least as much as 
by the currently enacted individual mandate.  The political process, 
but not the Constitution, blocked those or similar alternatives. 
Consider Medicare for All: Accepting that as a constitutional al-
ternative to the individual mandate,7 the real question before the 
Court, the real possibility for limiting federal power, is not the com-
merce power, but the spending power.  On that point, the structural 
issues before the Court during the New Deal may provide lessons for 
the current period.  The most important work of New Deal cases with 
respect to health care policy was not the expansion of commerce 
power8 or the demise of economic liberties,9 but the establishment of 
the federal welfare state under the spending power.  The New Deal 
cases did so in two respects: First, by adopting a broad interpretation 
of the General Welfare Clause as a discrete source of congressional 
authority; and, second, by endorsing a cooperative federalism ap-
proach to addressing social problems. 
Especially important for health care were the New Deal cases up-
holding the Social Security Act (SSA),10 the statute that now includes 
two core government health care programs, Medicare and Medicaid.  
First, a pre-cursor decision in 1936, United States v. Butler,11 although 
striking down President Roosevelt’s Agricultural Adjustment Act on 
Tenth Amendment grounds (and under the Court’s then-prevailing 
view that agricultural production is not “commerce”), also endorsed a 
broad Hamiltonian interpretation of spending power as not merely 
ancillary to the other enumerated powers.12  As long as Congress was 
addressing a general, not merely a specific, concern, the spending 
power could reach it.13  A pair of companion cases in 1937 carried the 
Butler General Welfare Clause interpretation forward to expressly up-
hold the SSA.  In Helvering v. Davis,14 the Court validated both Title 
VIII, imposing mandatory payroll taxes on employers, and the sepa-
rate Title II, authorizing payment of government pensions to old-age 
workers.  The Court held that both the taxing and spending provi-
 
 7 Even some of the strongest proponents of the view that the individual mandate is uncon-
stitutional agree that Medicare for All is constitutional.  See AALS Hot Topic Panel Question 
and Answer Session, 62 MERCER L. REV. 650, 660 (2011) (quoting remark by Professor 
Randy Barnett: “I just want to say, and maybe we’ll end on a point of agreement here, 
that if Medicare is constitutional, then Medicare for everyone is constitutional”). 
 8 See NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 9 See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). 
 10 Pub. L. No. 74-271, 49 Stat. 620 (1935). 
 11 297 U.S. 1. 
 12 Id. at 66. 
 13 Id. at 66–67. 
 14 301 U.S. 619 (1937). 
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sions of the SSA fell within the General Welfare Clause,15 recognizing 
that the problem of the elderly in need of support was clearly nation-
wide.16  In Steward Machine Co. v. Davis,17 the Court likewise upheld the 
federal unemployment compensation tax on employers.  Under the 
SSA, employers received a credit against the federal tax for any 
amount paid to a state unemployment compensation program.18  The 
Court rejected claims that the provision was an unconstitutional tax, 
or that it invaded states’ reserved powers or otherwise coerced states.19  
Steward Machine, accordingly, established the constitutional basis for 
conditional spending power.  The federal government could achieve 
broad policy objectives, not by commandeering or directly regulating 
states, but by placing incentives on them to participate in enacting 
federal programs.  The success of the SSA cooperative federalism 
strategy was soon evident.  In 1930, before the New Deal, only one 
state (Wisconsin) had a state unemployment compensation pro-
gram.20  By 1937, after the SSA, 43 states had passed unemployment 
compensation laws.21 
But where was health care in the New Deal?  The Court’s broad 
interpretation of the General Welfare Clause and constitutional ap-
proval of the SSA old-age pension and unemployment compensation 
provisions would similarly have supported a national health care pro-
gram.  President Roosevelt’s 1944 State of the Union Address and as-
pirational “Second Bill of Rights” included: “The right to adequate 
medical care and the opportunity to achieve and enjoy good 
health.”22  But the 1935 SSA had not achieved that goal due to politi-
cal objections, including widespread fear of socialized medicine and 
fragile political support for the Act itself.23  Health care would not be 
added to the SSA until President Johnson’s 1965 War on Poverty.  Be-
fore the New Deal, federal funding for health care was limited to 
public health aims, including infectious disease control and immigra-
tion, with some assistance to pregnant women, infants, and disabled 
 
 15 Id. at 640. 
 16 Id. at 641–44. 
 17 301 U.S. 548 (1937). 
 18 Id. at 574. 
 19 Id. at 585–87. 
 20 Id. at 587. 
 21 Id. at 587–88. 
 22 President’s Message to Congress on the State of the Union, 12 PUB. PAPERS 41 (Jan. 11, 
1944). 
 23 See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE 266–69 (1982); 
Robert I. Field, Regulation, Reform and the Creation of Free Market Health Care, 32 HAMLINE J. 
PUB. L. & POL’Y 301, 308 (2011). 
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children.24  The 1935 SSA extended limited public health funding to 
states,25 and those provisions faced no constitutional challenge.  Post-
New Deal federal health care legislation was similarly modest and tar-
geted to particular health care infrastructure needs or groups 
deemed especially deserving government assistance.26  By and large, 
federal legislation over the past century has been to support private 
health insurance, especially the rise of employer-based health insur-
ance.27 
The 1965 enactment of Medicare and Medicaid represents the 
high-water mark for federal health care legislation.  President John-
son’s Great Society programs did not arise out of the same nation-
wide economic depression as the New Deal but in many ways took up 
the unfinished business of Roosevelt’s social policy agenda.28  In the 
Civil Rights era, there was a sense that lack of access to essential social 
services perpetuates inequality just as much as direct discrimination.  
Congress addressed lack of access to medical care with three pro-
grams: Medicare Part A, Medicare Part B, and Medicaid.29  Those 
programs established a nationwide single-payer health care system, 
albeit limited to the elderly, disabled, and certain poor Americans.  
The programs were enacted as amendments to the Social Security 
Act, and Congress’s spending power authority under Butler, Helvering, 
and Steward Machine was never questioned.  Indeed, since the New 
 
 24 See LAWRENCE O. GOSTIN, PUBLIC HEALTH LAW: POWER, DUTY, RESTRAINT 155–61 (2d ed. 
2008); STARR, supra note 23, at 240–42; Elizabeth Fee & Theodore M. Brown, The Unful-
filled Promise of Public Health: Déjà Vu All Over Again, HEALTH AFF., Nov./Dec. 2002, at 31, 
34–35. 
 25 See STARR, supra note 23, at 270. 
 26 See STARR, supra note 23, at 270–71 (describing limited government health care programs, 
including poor farmer subsidies); see, e.g., Federal Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, Pub. L. 
No. 75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (1938) (expanding FDA’s regulatory role); Hospital Survey & 
Construction Act of 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-725, 60 Stat. 1040 (funding new hospital con-
struction and expansion); Kerr-Mills Act, Pub. L. No. 86-778, 74 Stat. 924 (1960) (provid-
ing federal assistance to the very poor elderly); see also THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE 
POLITICS OF MEDICARE 27–30 (2d ed. 2000) (describing limited government assistance 
under Kerr-Mills Act). 
 27 See David A. Hyman & Mark Hall, Two Cheers for Employment-Based Health Insurance, 2 YALE 
J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 23, 25–26 (2001) (discussing the historical rise of employ-
ment-based coverage, including wage and price controls, tax code incentives, and union 
pressure); Elizabeth Weeks Leonard, Can You Really Keep Your Health Plan?  The Limits of 
Grandfathering Under the Affordable Care Act, 36 J. CORP. L. 753, 760–61 (2011) (describing 
historical events that gave rise to employer-based health insurance). 
 28 See STARR, supra note 23, at 367; Fee & Brown, supra note 24, at 39. 
 29 See MARMOR, supra note 26, at 59–60 (describing the three parts of the legislation); STARR, 
supra, note 23, at 369 (similarly describing the “three-layered cake”). 
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Deal, the Court has struck down no federal program as exceeding the 
spending power.30 
The only significant political objection to Medicare and Medicaid 
came from the physician community, which feared government con-
trol of the practice of medicine and intrusion on the physician-
patient relationship.31  Those concerns were addressed with consider-
able concessions, including Part B itself, which added optional physi-
cian services to the Part A mandatory coverage for inpatient hospital 
care, and allowed balance billing by physicians.32  In addition, the 
programs maintained an active role for private insurers and provid-
ers, through reimbursement methodologies and claims administra-
tion.33 
The absence of comparable expansion of the federal welfare state 
since 1965 is not because such programs would be unconstitutional.  
Rather, federal health reform policy has maintained a commitment 
to private solutions, especially shoring up the now-dominant employ-
er-based system, through which the majority of insured Americans re-
ceive their coverage.34  In terms of federal health care legislation, the 
2003 enactment of Medicare Part D, an optional outpatient prescrip-
tion drug benefit, was as dramatic as it has gotten.35  And that Bush-
era program is conspicuously a “managed competition” model,36 with 
a gaping 100%-self-pay “doughnut” hole.37  Even within big govern-
 
 30 See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Defense of the Constitutionality of the Individual Mandate, 62 
MERCER L. REV. 618, 618 (“Since 1937, the Supreme Court has struck down no major so-
cial program.”); COENEN, supra note 1, at 185 (“In the post-1936 period, the Court has 
upheld federal spending programs without exception.”). 
 31 See MARMOR, supra note 26, at 58; STARR, supra note 23, at 369; Field, supra note 23, at 
313. 
 32 See MARMOR, supra note 26, at 60–61. 
 33 See Field, supra note 23, at 313–14. 
 34 See Leonard, supra note 27, at 760 (noting that 61% of the non-elderly population obtains 
health insurance from an employer plan); see, e.g., Health Maintenance Organization Act 
of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-222, 87 Stat. 914 (providing grants to employers for adding HMOs 
to health plans); Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), Pub. L. No. 
93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (creating extensive federal regulation of employee benefit plans, in-
cluding health plans); Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. 
No. 99-272, 100 Stat. 82 (allowing employees to maintain employer-based health insur-
ance after termination for certain qualifying events); Health Insurance Portability and 
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (allowing em-
ployees to change jobs without being excluded from health plans for pre-existing condi-
tions). 
 35 The Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. 
No. 108-173, 117 Stat. 2066. 
 36 See Jonathan Oberlander, Through the Looking Glass: The Politics of the Medicare Prescription 
Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act, 32 J. HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 187, 201–02 
(2007). 
 37 42 U.S.C. § 1395w-102(b). 
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ment programs, the private market continues to dominate health 
care delivery. 
Against that historical backdrop, the sleeper issue in the Afforda-
ble Care Act, and the real potential for contraction of federal author-
ity, is the spending power.  The Supreme Court’s most surprising 
move thus far was granting certiorari to the states’ Medicaid chal-
lenge in the Florida lawsuit.  No circuit court had ruled in the states’ 
favor on that question, and similar challenges to even broader, more 
sweeping expansions of Medicaid have not succeeded.38  The States’ 
argument rests on a suggestion in Steward Machine,39 revived in South 
Dakota v. Dole,40 that federal conditions on funding to states could, at 
some as-yet-unidentified point, pass the point of pressure and be-
come unconstitutionally coercive.  Acknowledging that the Medicaid 
program has been in place for over fifty years, with every state volun-
tarily agreeing to participate and many changes to the coverage and 
eligibility requirements over the life of the program,41 states neverthe-
less argue that the ACA’s particular expansion of Medicaid now con-
stitutes coercion.  If the Court takes this opportunity to limit the 
spending power and to restrict congressional amendment of existing 
cooperative programs, that decision could have significant implica-
tions.  That could give rise to a constitutional crisis. 
The New Deal established a firm foundation for cooperative fed-
eralism, on which Medicaid and so many other programs are built.  
Arthur Miller, writing in 1958, quoted Woodrow Wilson in 1908, 
opining, at the turn of the century, that “the question of the relation 
of the States to the federal government is the cardinal question of our 
constitutional system.”42  But by the time Miller wrote fifty years later, 
he maintained “that question has largely been settled.”43  To Miller, 
Helvering and Steward Machine, upholding the SSA, “gave final consti-
tutional approval to the outlines of cooperative federalism.  Once 
breached, the dam has never been repaired; the trickle became a 
stream and then a flood.”44  Going forward, Miller saw states as not 
 
 38 See Florida v. HHS, 648 F.3d 1235, 1265 (2011) (citing cases). 
 39 301 U.S. at 589–90. 
 40 483 U.S. at 211. 
 41 See Brief of Amici Curiae Health Law & Policy Scholars and Prescription Policy Choices in 
Support of Respondents on the Constitutional Validity of the Medicaid Expansion at 1–
13, Florida v. HHS, No. 11-400 (U.S. Feb. 17, 2012) available at http://aca-
litigation.wikispaces.com/file/view/Health+Law+%26+Policy+Scholars+amicus+%2811-
400+Medicaid%29.pdf (describing Medicaid program expansions). 
 42 Arthur S. Miller, The Constitutional Law of the “Security State”, 10 STAN. L. REV. 620, 635–36 
(1958). 
 43 Id. at 636. 
 44 Id. at 629. 
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much more than federal “housekeepers.”45  By and large, any new, 
important activities of state governments are federally funded: “When 
new problems arise, eyes swivel to Washington, not to the state capi-
tol.”46 
Consistent with Miller’s prescience, ACA derives from federal leg-
islation but relies heavily on state cooperation to enact the compre-
hensive reforms.  That expectation is not limited to Medicaid.  State-
based health insurance exchanges are intended to be the central pil-
lars of the reformed private market for individual and small group 
health insurance.47  Also, states were invited to assist the federal gov-
ernment in establishing stop-gap, high-risk insurance pools, almost as 
soon as ACA was enacted.48  Recently, federal authorities passed on 
the task of defining a fundamental component of the private market 
health reforms, the “essential health benefits” package, to states.49  
Accordingly, the Court’s ruling on Medicaid expansion would have 
implications for the operation of those provisions of ACA, as well as a 
host of other long-standing cooperative federal-state programs. 
The implications of Supreme Court review of the conditional 
spending power were highlighted in a different case this term, Doug-
las v. Independent Living Center of Southern California.50  The question in 
Douglas was whether Medicaid beneficiaries or providers can sue 
states to enforce compliance with federal requirements.  Precedent is 
clear that there is no individually enforceable statutory right to state 
compliance.51  Instead, the Douglas Petitioners challenged California’s 
Medicaid policies on supremacy (federal preemption) grounds.52  Af-
ter granting review and hearing argument, the Court declined to an-
swer the question because federal authorities in the meanwhile had 
 
 45 Id. 
 46 Id. 
 47 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (Supp. IV 2010).  See also Troy J. Oechsner & Magda Schaler-Haynes, 
Keeping It Simple: Health Plan Benefit Standardization and Regulatory Choice under the Affordable 
Care Act, 74 ALA. L. REV. 241, 284–93 (2010–2011) (describing the operation of exchang-
es). 
 48 42 U.S.C. § 18001 (Supp. IV 2010); News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 
HHS Secretary Sebelius Announces New Pre-Existing Condition Insurance Plan (July 1, 
2010), available at http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2010pres/07/20100701a.html. 
 49 See News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., HHS to Give 
States More Flexibility to Implement Health Reform (Dec. 16, 2011), available at http://
www.hhs.gov/news/press/2011pres/12/20111216c.html; see also Alan Weil, The Value of 
Federalism in Defining Essential Health Benefits, 366 NEW ENG. J. MED. 679, 679 (2012), avail-
able at http://www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1200693. 
 50 Nos. 09-958, 09-1158 & 10-283 (U.S. 2011) (consolidated). 
 51 See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Sanchez v. Johnson, 416 F.3d 1051, 1062 
(9th Cir. 2005) (applying Gonzaga in Medicaid context). 
 52 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., No. 09-958 (U.S. 2011), available at http://
www.supremecourt.gov/qp/09-00958qp.pdf (questions presented). 
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approved California’s allegedly noncompliant Medicaid program.53  
Thus, the question remains unresolved.  The possibility of Supremacy 
Clause challenges to state laws purporting to implement federal 
standards could radically affect administration of those cooperative 
programs.  For example, if states agree, but then fail, to establish 
ACA-compliant exchanges, could individuals sue to force them to do 
so?54  More generally, can individuals sue to prevent state misconduct 
under federal program rules and regulations? 
Returning to the questions put to our panel: The current crisis, if 
any, is political, not constitutional.  Assuming we agree that Congress 
could get at the health insurance coverage and health care access 
problems another way, through different exercises of commerce or 
spending power, then there is no “crisis” about the scope of federal 
power.  Moreover, there is no pressing need to contract or expand 
federal power in order to address societal problems.  There is noth-
ing for which the law needs to find a way.  The crisis—or more 
properly, opportunity—is political.  Most Americans agree that we 
need to do something about the health care system.  And most peo-
ple are deeply troubled by many commercial insurance practices, in-
cluding the manner in which insurers currently exclude individuals 
and price health insurance policies for those who arguably need cov-
erage the most.55 
To address those concerns, the one solution that made it through 
Congress—and one initially proposed by a conservative think-tank in 
response to Clinton health reform56—was to require (most) everyone 
to purchase insurance before they think they need it and to give fed-
eral tax incentives and subsidies to help them comply.  Politically, 
that approach reveals that we remain more comfortable with a pri-
vate, competitive market for health care, rather than Medicare for 
All.  So either we get comfortable with Medicare for All, get there, 
and tackle all the challenges of a single-payer system.  Or we continue 
to put incentives, subsidies, and nudges in place, perhaps even excis-
ing the individual mandate from ACA, and see if people come 
 
 53 Douglas v. Indep. Living Ctr. of S. Cal., 2012 WL 5555204 (U.S.). 
 54 See Sara Rosenbaum, Equal Access for Medicaid Beneficiaries—The Supreme Court and 
the Douglas Cases, 365 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2245 (2011), available at http://www.nejm.org/
doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMp1111428 (discussing implications of private oversight of ACA 
implementation). 
 55 See Kaiser Health Tracking Poll: Public Opinion on Health Care Issues, THE HENRY J. KAISER 
FAMILY FOUNDATION, at 6 (Sept. 2011), available at http://www.kff.org/kaiserpolls/
upload/8230-F.pdf. 
 56 See Stuart M. Butler, Assuring Affordable Health Care for All Americans, THE HERITAGE 
FOUNDATION, at 6 (1989), available at http://healthcarereform.procon.org/sourcefiles/
1989_assuring_affordable_health_care_for_all_americans.pdf. 
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around on their own.57  The political opportunity in the Affordable 
Care Act litigation, however the Court rules on the individual man-
date, is allowing the electorate to consider the alternative of a more 
comprehensive, welfare-state approach to health care by closely ex-
amining the private market alternative.  Where that opportunity 
could derail into crisis is if the Court, for the first time in seventy-five 
years, substantially limits Congress’s authority under the General 
Welfare Clause. 
 
 57 At least some studies suggest that most uninsured people actually want health insurance 
but simply cannot afford it and that other ACA provisions may make it affordable enough 
for most.  See GAO Report, supra note 6, at 14 (noting experts’ conclusions that most 
people would prefer to purchase health insurance but that high cost is a barrier); John F. 
Sheils & Randall Haught, Without The Individual Mandate, The Affordable Care Act Would Still 
Cover 23 Million; Premiums Would Rise Less Than Predicted, HEALTH AFF., Nov. 2011, at 1 
(summarizing Lewin group study findings that 23 million people would still get coverage, 
only 7.8 million fewer than with the mandate). 
